Court of Petty Appeals: Office of Private Practice v. Public Interest Law Association
Office of Private Practice
v.
Public Interest Law Association
77 U.Va 10 (2024)
Coleman, J., delivers the opinion of the Court, in which Jones, Demitry, & Coco, JJ., join.
Allard, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Allen, J., dissenting.
Coleman, J., delivers the opinion of the Court.
With all the attention on the Public Interest Law Association (“PILA”) over the past week, the Office of Private Practice (“OPP”) felt like something had to be done. So, OPP and every major U.S. law firm filed this class action lawsuit against PILA, seeking compensatory damages for decades of brain drain away from BigLaw and a permanent injunction that would dissolve PILA once and for all. Plaintiffs claim that PILA is guilty of civil RICO violations, antitrust violations, and common law fraud. All parties submitted motions for summary judgment, and the lower court granted the defendant’s motion in full. We reverse in part and issue a unique injunction. PILA is not guilty of any of these alleged legal wrongs. But this Court will stretch its equity powers to their fullest extent. From now on, PILA must include a disclaimer that firms allow pro bono work.
I
We begin by noting that the plaintiffs do have legitimate beef with PILA. As one anonymous BigLaw partner put it: “I can no longer trust the prestige of the top law schools. How am I supposed to run a practice group when my best associates leave after three years to go work in some public defender’s office? And how am I supposed to justify these bills when the junior lawyers in the DOJ’s office are better than my own associates?” Another partner voiced similar concerns: “Top students routinely come into summer associateships with fanciful ideas like there is somehow more to law than private practice. PILA is to blame.” The issue that firms are facing is that too many brilliant students are presented with alternative career paths.
PILA responds by saying public interest work is an admirable pursuit and a cornerstone of legal practice. While boring, they have a point.
II
Both the RICO and antitrust claims are based on anti-competitive conduct committed by PILA. Plaintiffs allege that PILA is given significant access to law students and abuses notions of “justice,” “public service,” and “morality.” The Court considers these to be sharp business practices and therefore finds them anticompetitive.
But plaintiffs fail to address the proximate cause issue. While law students mainly act to earn the recognition and praise of others, they retain some independent thinking. And a law student’s choice to pursue public interest is what ultimately causes harm to the plaintiffs, not necessarily the solicitations of PILA. So, both RICO and antitrust claims are dismissed for failure to show proximate cause.
III
When evaluating the fraud claim, we apply our own common law. A plaintiff asserts a claim for fraud when there is a misrepresentation of fact, that the statement-maker intended the plaintiff to rely on, that caused injury, and that would be funny to compensate. The statement at issue is that students can have fruitful lives outside of private practice. While an obvious misrepresentation, the plaintiffs are not the proper class to bring suit. They therefore lack standing, despite their efforts to assert third-party standing.
The true victims of PILA are the lawyers who could have had rewarding careers in private practice but chose instead to work in the public sector. Imagine the horror of being a U.S. Attorney, non-profit general counsel, special counsel, or public defender. It is the Robert Muellers ’73 of the world who fall victim to PILA.
No matter what plaintiffs say, they have not established a case for third-party standing. Those lawyers themselves are in a perfect position to assert their own rights. Any harm done to the firms is purely incidental to that suffered by these lawyers. So, the fraud claims must fail.
IV
While the plaintiffs have lost on every issue addressed so far, this Court loves to offer buzzer-beater opinions that change everything in the final section à la Marbury. So, this Court recognizes that it is sitting in equity. And no justices have a clear understanding of what equity means, so we take it as a license to do whatever we want when the law fails, just as St. Thomas Moore would have wanted. We therefore raise the pro bono issue sua sponte.
Firms do allow their lawyers to participate in pro bono work, and compensate them for their time spent helping those clients. We think that this nuance is lacking in PILA’s approach to law students. We therefore order that this disclaimer be included in all PILA communications:
Public interest work can be found in private practice through pro bono projects. Wealthy attorneys are not all evil.
The Court thinks that this should be enough to remedy the legitimate beef of plaintiffs. And since we don’t understand equity, we don’t think proximate cause and standing should limit our ability to dole out bizarre injunctions. It is so ORDERED.
Allard, C.J., concurring as to parts I-III and dissenting as to part IV.
Though I am loath to admit it, I agree with Justice Coleman that the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment must fail. The remedy sought by Plaintiffs—siphoning off UVA Law’s last remaining public interest students to work eighty hours a week for America’s bluest-blooded aristocrats—easily passes the canon of uncomical avoidance. But in light of my recent dissent in LexisNexis v. Doe, I cannot let humorous considerations override the clear law at issue in this case. See 22-77-9CV (Allard, C.J., dissenting) (“Yes, we must commit to the bit, but in doing so, we must follow proper procedure and at least kinda adhere to our law.”).
But I believe Justice Coleman errs in crafting a compromise equitable remedy. While the principle I set out in Doe precludes granting Plaintiffs’ motion at law, nothing prohibits such a ruling in equity, where Pettry Rule 1 is at its strongest. See PRCP 1 (“We do what we want.”). Moreover, it would be particularly funny to hold that the law prevents a summary judgment motion for Plaintiffs, only to grant the same motion styled as an “equitable remedy.” Nothing prevents us from doing this. See Law Weekly Editors v. Allard, 76 U.Va 21 (2024) (“[W]ho is going to stop me? You?”). Moreover, the Court’s equitable remedy, ostensibly in Plaintiffs’ favor, is an insult to their convictions. In bringing this suit, they have embraced their inner evil. It is not for us to deny them their freedom of conscience.
In short, I would uphold the District Court’s summary judgment order under some inventive equitable doctrine. I thus respectfully dissent.
Allen, J., dissenting
As the only 3L Justice of this Court who spent the prior summer outside of the ivory (or, more commonly in the age of modern architecture, glass) tower of the firm, I feel the need to correct some illusions peddled by this court. First, the assertion that “[w]ealthy attorneys are not all evil” is contestable at best, as most individuals are middling if not outright contemptible—an original sin that is only exacerbated by both legal education and money. More importantly, this Court once again goes to bat for the privileged class to which they belong, at the expense of discrete and insular minorities. A sense of superiority and moral opprobrium by public interest students towards their private practice peers is the only material advantage that these poor souls can claim. To diminish this under the guise of “equity” sullies whatever legitimacy remains for this Court. Thus, I dissent.
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jxu6ad@virginia.edu
