Court of Petty Appeals: Locker 3231 et al. v. Deadbeat John Does

Locker 3231 et al.

 v.

Deadbeat John Does

78 U.Va 8 (2025)

Rehman, J., delivers the opinion of the Court, in which Wu, Vanger, Berklich, J.J., and Demitry, C.J, join.

Lozada, J., dissents.

Rehman, J., delivers the opinion of the Court.

The owner of a locker undertakes a covenant to caretake said locker for the duration of their time at the Law School. It is well understood and undisputed by the litigants that the lockers particular to this building are quasi-sentient beings that require nurturing and attention, not unlike a child or one of the esteemed panel’s judges at 2 a.m. on The Corner. We are presented today with the question of how a locker so thoroughly neglected by its student-parent as to be ignorant of their identity may find redress for its abandonment.

 There are several lockers within our jurisdiction that have been abandoned by their parent after being opened indefinitely (See Exhibits A, B, and C). The complaints of these lockers have been consolidated into this case appealed by Locker 3231 (a.k.a. Li’l Locke). These lockers, ajar and vulnerable, are unduly and suddenly exposed to the broader Law School building, an exposure which they would otherwise be shielded from as all innocent beings can expect to be. The locker-plaintiffs filed their complaints through human patrons in the GroupMe against unknown defendants (their parents) and provided sufficient detail to identify the student-parents if they were to read it. As of yet, no student has read any of the GroupMe solicitations and retrieved their locker from undeserved banishment. Meanwhile, the chill of winter grows nearer.

We are asked by Respondents to provide more expedient relief so that they may find their parents, against each parent’s will if necessary. As a threshold matter, we note that extraordinary relief is unnecessary so long as it can be assumed that law students will read the GroupMe, realize “oh gee oh wow, I left my locker open with the keys inside. Let me go fix that,” and then race to lovingly reunite with their locker. This has not been the case. While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reason that this has not occurred, we note that the predicate assumption of each law student’s literacy is doubtful. But we continue to support the presumption that law students who can read would reunite with their lockers if they saw the notice.

Petitioners also alleged below that GroupMe is shadowbanning content posted by lockers, though the petty trial court held that they failed to meet the pleading standard. Our panel cannot think of a reason why we should not allow a suit against GroupMe (of any kind) to move forward, so we reinstate GroupMe as a defendant and openly encourage more plaintiffs to keep suing their asses until they get their app in order.

The case turns in part on whether we continue to hold to the outdated presumption that law students are literate. The presumption of literacy has long been at odds with the doctrine of uncomical avoidance established under Chief Justice, emerita, Lake, in Gay Section H, 75 U.Va at 5 (“There is nothing more vital to the exercise of justice than committing to the bit.”). Indeed, the presumption of literacy is strained also by compounding microplastics in our brains, the existence of TikTok generally, the marked increase in quality television out there, and new text-to-speech functions on Quimbee. We are enjoined (as in encouraged) to overturn the presumption of literacy by public policy considerations as well: maybe Law Weekly will buy a bunch of little town crier bells and have their writers roam around North Grounds yelling out their silly little stories. That would be fun.

Respondents (deadbeat dads, all of them) having failed to convince us otherwise, and our minds easily swayed by the stories of the poor, abandoned lockers and indeed any shiny thing that passes our field of vision, we hereby overrule the presumption of literacy: no longer shall our hallowed jurisprudence be run aground by antiquated beliefs that our citizenry can even read this sentence. The defense calls this rational decision an overreach. Not only does this misunderstand the reach of this Court (infinite and unqualified), but it misunderstands the entire point of this Court (which is a secret that we decline to divulge).

Upon this finding we must reconsider what the appropriate relief should be for abandoned lockers whose GroupMe pleas have gone unanswered by presumably illiterate law students. Petitioners’ counsel have urged that we mandate that law students suspected of fathering an abandoned locker undergo genetic paternity testing. And we were ready to provide this equitable relief until we reviewed an amicus brief from The French Philandering Society reminding us of our duty under Article 16-11 of the French Civil Code to steeply limit paternity testing.[1] So we are called to additionally decide upon whether we will continue to voluntarily succumb to the oppressive weight of the French Civil Code (alongside Louisiana, for some reason), or whether we will finally let good ol’ American reason guide our jurisprudence. Although the Court’s justices certainly admire Napoleon and model their ego-driven and tyrannical behavior off his, this admiration is not coextensive with a duty to accept his fancy pants Code. In fact, the justices of this court have consistently held to the maxim ego potest habere crustulam meam et comedam illud (I can have my cake and eat it too). Marie Antoinette would be proud.

Amicus briefs filed by the Virginia Journal of International Law (VJIL) and the Virginia Law Wine Society (VLWS) have been admittedly lost by our clerks. Our chambers are kind of a mess since the wasps took over half of it. We can assume they wanted us to keep adhering to the French Civil Code for some reason, but cannot consider their specific arguments because they are currently covered in wasps. How’s that for animal law?

Under the Court’s decisions today, a new prospect of relief is opened up to lockers negligently abandoned by their deadbeat owners. Their prayer for relief has been answered by equitable relief in the form of mandatory paternity testing to find the owner of each and every abandoned locker, coupled with court-mandated counseling to facilitate long-term emotional reconciliation between every aggrieved child-locker and every negligent parent-student.

So ordered.

Lozada, J., Dissenting.

The majority opinion represents a startling act of judicial overreach that ventures into a domain where this Court has no authority. It fabricates a crisis whose scope is well-established and, in doing so, tramples upon the clear and established authority of the Office of Student Affairs.

The University of Virginia School of Law assigns to Student Affairs the primary responsibility for determining the manner of selecting the pairing of a locker and a student. This is not a matter of judicial interpretation; it is a clear delegation of administrative authority. The Court, in its ruling today, attempts to side-step this lawful authority and create an alternative tribunal where lockers may gain relief from the perils of life as a storage shed for softball bats, evidence casebooks, and suits embroidered with the summoning spells that OPP asks us to lovingly whisper in an associate’s ear. Such a decision threatens the balance of power between our Court and Student Affairs and creates a dangerous precedent for judicial meddling. If the Court can intervene in locker assignments, what administrative function is safe from its grasp? Will we next be asked to rule on the appropriate temperature for the classrooms in Slaughter Hall or the fairness of the 1L softball talent distribution?[2]

Furthermore, the legal conclusion that the long-standing presumption of literacy among law students must be overruled is an assertion so untethered from reality that it threatens the very foundation of this institution. While my colleagues lament the rise of TikTok and the allure of quality television, they ignore the fact that this Court’s entire model is predicated on the simple assumption that our readership can, in fact, read. If we accept the majority's premise, we render every prior ruling of this Court nothing but a meaningless exercise. The Court does not issue opinions through dance videos to be seen while mindlessly doomscrolling (yet) or through reality shows so desperate for views that they cast Taylor Frankie Paul as the next Bachelorette. Instead, we choose to issue our opinions in the same time-honored method as our peers: a collection of words containing a marginal amount of self-aggrandizing, a mention of an obscure source inserted solely to demonstrate how good the author would be at trivia, and a small set of cloaked jabs at a judicial rival for fun.[3] Reading is fundamental to sharing our knowledge with the world in this form, and as such we should approach an assertion of broad illiteracy carefully. The Court need not undermine its own legitimacy by accepting this assertion to come to a conclusion to this question, and resting our reasoning on this ground may lead to an unstable foundation of law moving forward. Overruling the assumption that law students are capable of reading jeopardizes many of our past decisions. See e.g. FRACK-PAC v. SBA, 77 U.Va 20 (2025) (ruling against petitioner who failed to submit a form which presumably required reading); In re Law Weekly Cybersecurity Disaster 77 U.Va 13 (2025) (allowing for damages in a suit revolving around a lack of website access which also presumably required reading). As such, when it comes to this precedent’s value in the uniform and even application of the law,  “[u]ncertainty in [this] regard counsels retention of the status quo.”[4]

The pairing of a locker and a student is one that may take on many different forms, and whether the Court must remedy a form found unsatisfactory to either party is a question to which our current precedent is ill-equipped to answer. A far more prudent path would have been to defer to the capable hands of Student Affairs, whose superior skill and foresight may help lead to a set of harmonious relationships between lockers and students without the blunt and overwrought intervention of this Court.

Lastly, some merit exists in discussing the policy implications of our decision today. While this Court values justice, equity, and fairness, this Court also deeply values the ability to get a free Clif Bar from Student Affairs. This dangerous encroachment on their territory risks upsetting the delicate balance between us and eroding the goodwill that has been previously cultivated. We should favor maintaining the strong separation of powers as the Law School intended, and bank our favors to instead beg them to add Celsius to the snack roster during finals week.

For these reasons, I would affirm the existing administrative process and dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction. We are a court of law, not a committee for lost and found.

[1] See https://idtodna.com/paternity-test-in-france/ (“France has banned the sale and use of home paternity test kits. Authorities believe that these kits contribute to family disagreements and arguments that may lead to breakups . . . . This situation raises concerns that allowing DNA tests to be conducted freely could tear apart families. Consequently, a law exists to preserve family peace.”)

[2] Scoreboard.

[3] Unlike our peers, however, we have not yet figured out how to monetize our opinions by allowing professors to delete the worthless parts and sell the rest for $400 a pop. If you have ideas, please consider writing a guest opinion piece on the subject for the Virginia Law Weekly.

[4] Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1709, 1726 (2013).