Court of Petty Appeals: Justice of COPA v. Public Interest Law Association (“PILA”) and PILA Auction Winner
Justices of COPA
v.
Public Interest Law Association (PILA) and PILA Auction Winner, Lizze Shaw
78 U.Va 14 (2026)
Moore, J., Majority Opinion.
The Court is hereby confronted with a complaint from the same, which lesser courts may deem sufficient to conflict its interests, but which this Court finds perfectly able to adjudicate due to the lack of appellate options—God has not seen fit to answer our queries since the careful inquiry of Jonathan Doe v. Benvin Lozada. See Jonathan Doe v. Benvin Lozada, 78 U.Va 5 (2025). Additionally, the Court maintains its ability to do as it pleases, and it finds the complainant’s action to be Petty and therefore satisfactory. See Petty Rules of Civil Procedure § 4. Upon determining the jurisdiction of this august January Court to hear this matter in all its meticulosity, to hear the aforementioned matter is the next step at hand—or ear rather, as to hear with one’s hands is beyond the abilities of humans despite promising research by our Dutch and Connecticuter colleagues. See Wim Pouw, Alexandra Paxton, Steven J. Harrison, James Dixon, Acoustic information about upper limb movement in voicing, 117 (21) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 11364-11367 (2020). Lastly, to further assuage the concerns of any observer, the wall separating the complaining and adjudicating functions of the Court is stronger even than that most impenetrable of barriers dividing our most esteemed Gothamite colleague from his arch nemesis who fulfills the adage about where to keep one’s friends and enemies. See BATMAN: THE ANIMATED SERIES: Two-Face Part 1 and Two-Face Part 2 (Fox television broadcast, aired 1992).
The complainant brings a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation against the defendants. It is alleged that in yesteryear it was represented unto the Court that offering a COPA as a prize in the PILA auction would not result in the Court having to convene over the several fortnights-long recess during which the Court is plenty occupied with its traditional winter pastimes of Saturnalian merriment, trips to europa, and après-ski larping. The Court brings this allegation on the grounds that despite the grandiosity of the legal logic on display in prior decisions, the readership of the publication containing COPA opinions would never pay for the privilege of being featured on account of such financial resources being reserved for more respectable establishments such as Courts & Commerce and, after noting the high prices of the sacred text(books)s at Courts & Commerce, Amazon. See Jonathan Doe v. Benvin Lozada 78 U.Va 5 (2025), the dissent to Albino Squirrel v. UVA Football Fans 78 U.Va 7 (2025), and Star Wars: The Last Jedi (Disney 2017).
Despite the Court relying on this implication of having free time, a concept only rivaled in mythicality by Homer’s tale of yore and Sir Christopher Nolan’s upcoming tale of the same, PILA and the winner of this auction conspired to renege on this implication by allowing the prize to be won. See Homer, Odyssey (8th century B.C.) and The Odyssey (Universal Pictures 2026). The court’s reliance is evidenced by an itinerary of winter sports surpassed only by that conducted by the esteemed Sir Roger Moore (sadly no known relation) in 1981 and by the Meneghino and Ampezzani in 2026. See For Your Eyes Only (United Artists 1981). However this was rendered moot by the bidding upon the Law Weekly’s prize in the PILA auction, so rather than a biathlon of skiing and shooting, the Court was forced to convene for a much more boring biathlon of rǣdan ænde wrítian. Such a discrepancy in activities can only result in damages being done unto the Court, though this rests upon the assumption that injuries would not result from the Court’s first foray into such sports as skiing, shooting, tobogganing, et cetera. Given the famous natural athletic abilities of the Court, this is adjudged to be an assumption most safe.
On the other hand (definitely hand and not ear in this instance), the defendants have lodged a defense seemingly accompanied by such elements, including money, as to require the Court to not ignore it. See Petty Rules of Civil Procedure § 5(b)(1)(A-B). The defendants in this instance claim to have neither made such a representation nor possessed the scienter to inflict such grievous damage upon the Court.
Whilst the defendants have claimed to have abstained from making such a representation, the Court finds evidence of this lack of a statement lacking. The defendants have neither produced nor shown a statement indicating a lack of a statement, which inherently means such a misrepresentational statement is indeed a possibility, and even a probability. After all, this seems to be a case of the defendants saying that what they are saying is in fact unsaid, to which we must review the precedent of “it’s not unsaid if you say it.” See SUCCESSION: Shit Show at the Fuck Factory (HBO 2018). By saying that the statement is unsaid is to ignore that such a statement is in fact a statement which the Court must respect as such. To allege such a defense without proper evidence would leave the Court no choice but to disagree with it. The defendants’ related claim that they have not uttered a statement, but rather a commonwealthment given the relevant geography, is amusing but not persuasive given the Court’s definition of state as encompassing “any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States” (this definition does give rise to the question of whether the United States is or ought to be counting government owned property, or “possession[s]” as additional states, but such an issue is to be saved for a future case). See 2 U.S.C. § 1602 (16).
Additionally, the defendants have claimed to have not intended to deprive the Court of its vacation during the lux brumalis. Regardless, the Court here finds that the particular intent of the defendants can be divined through the principle of res ipsa loquitur, because as stated in the Jacksonian tale, “one does not simply [interrupt another’s winter vacation]”. See The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring (New Line Cinema 2001).
Lastly, whilst the individual defendant has claimed that the Court ought not ignore its pleading on account of the pecuniary attachment to its victory in the auction, the Court has encountered these funds not in its account but rather in that of the fellow defendant, PILA, which would seem to render the effect moot. Therefore, the Court finds that in analyzing and rejecting the defense’s defenses it has gone above and beyond the reasonable care which would have allowed the acclaimed Court to merely ignore these defenses.
Thus, the Court opines that PILA and the winner of the PILA auction winner are guilty of misrepresentation and that a fair sentence is to not require the Court to work further during this second most hallowed break of the term. If the defendants were to procure a shrubbery to make the Court’s waspy companions feel more at home in the office, this would also be appreciated–after all, since the Court has gone above and beyond as a token of its goodwill, a reciprocation by the defendants in going above and beyond and procuring a shrubbery would thus be looked upon favorably by the Court.
Moore, J., Dissenting.
Given the Court’s decision that there exist strong barriers between different complaining and adjudicating functions of the Court, the same has no choice but to insist on the existence of a further separate function, that is, the dissenting function. See Justices of COPA v. Public Interest Law Association (PILA) and PILA Auction Winner 78 U.Va 14 (2026). Given this distinction, a dissent must be lodged to contest this very distinction. Unlike the Gothamite colleague whom the Court references most frequently, the Court has not endured any vats of acid or other chemicals, so this distinction must be respected when determining that the other type of distinction is nonexistent. The lack of such an impenetrable barrier betwixt the functions means that the justice ought to have recused himself from adjudging the complaint from the same. Given this lack of distinctions, it makes one wonder whether this dissent is even possible or if its own author ought also to be recused from dissenting from the majority opinion of the same on account of the same allegations of conflict of interest. Despite these moral and philosophical conundrums, the dissent will hereby be filed according to the Court’s commitment to the bit. See Petty Rules of Civil Procedure § 3.