Will Holt ‘23
Reviews Editor
Carrying out their duties along the Ukrainian frontier, Russian troops surely grow impatient as they await the final order from Moscow. Of the more than 100,000 men stationed in this sector, I imagine a scarce few do not look upon the brewing conflict and feel a combination of agitation and anticipation. As much certainly is understandable. Few of them were alive to witness the breakup of the Soviet Union, and fewer still served a day in the Soviet Armed Forces. The tragedy of the Romanovs, the sorrows and triumphs of the Great Patriotic War, Sputnik, and even the ’79 invasion of Afghanistan are but stories told in school and around the dinner table. Nevertheless, the Russian soldiers today menacing their Ukrainian kin see themselves as the modern incarnation of past generations who fought and froze on that same soil. Perhaps to our chagrin, this perception is rather acute. French, Germans, Poles, and others have used the open spaces of the Ukraine[1] as a nearly perfect invasion corridor leading to the heart of Holy Russia. In the present day, however, the Russian army is not the reactive party, but rather the aggressor. The great corridor through Eastern Europe no longer points to Moscow or Petersburg, but rather to Kyiv—and beyond.
The Russian Armed Forces face a deceptively simple task: Cut through Southern Donbass in the direction of Donetsk, breakthrough in the north (perhaps as far north as Kharkiv), and in a classic pincer movement, envelope the tens-of-thousands of experienced Ukrainian troops currently deployed in the region. Having decapitated the Ukrainian army in the field, Russian forces would then be able to consolidate their gains east of the Dnieper or even pivot north to march on Kyiv. Such an encirclement, however, is far easier said than done.
The borders of eastern Ukraine create an artificial salient, or bulge, in the lines, giving the Russians easy and obvious access to the Ukrainian flanks and rear. No general with all of his faculties would simply allow his forces to become encircled—he of course would order a prompt and orderly retreat to a more defensible line. Should such a maneuver be attempted, the Russians would have to advance with sufficient speed and momentum to prevent the Ukrainians from disengaging and falling back towards the Dnieper before the trap shuts. The former can accomplish this task, but only with sufficient superiority in numbers and or firepower. Early estimations held that they would require 300,000 to half-a-million men to conduct an invasion and defeat the Ukrainians in the field. To the confusion of many, however, barely a third of that number have actually been deployed along the border.
One possible reason for this discrepancy is that Vladimir Putin does not intend to conduct a full invasion but rather, to quote President Biden, plans a “limited incursion.” But this idea is the product of wishful thinking—a dream of “peace for our time.” A force of 100,000 men is not a winning army. It is a liability. The Ukrainian government has mobilized more than 400,000 troops, and although many undoubtedly are but undertrained and underequipped reservists, that figure alone should give any Russian strategist reason to worry.
The more likely explanation for the low Russian troop numbers is that Putin has yet to reveal his full hand, leaving the rest of the world guessing as to the true disposition of his forces and their intended objectives. Although perhaps politically advantageous, conducting an invasion while still mobilizing the bulk of one’s own forces is a perilous mission—at least when the invaded party is a peer adversary. A defensive and overly-cautious enemy will likely miss key opportunities to hinder one’s advance. Ukraine must not fall into this mold. If Russian troops cross the frontier, Ukrainian forces cannot afford to hesitate. Troops caught inside the salient must conduct an orderly withdrawal to more secure lines, ideally while a large mobile force launches a massive counterattack against the Russian right, near the angle in the border. By pulling back endangered units and threatening the Russian flank, the Ukrainians could temporarily gain the initiative and steel themselves for a more comprehensive and attritional defense. Unfortunately, this likely represents a best-case scenario. Ukrainian forces can surprise the Russians and halt their advance, but only temporarily. Russian technology, reserves, and foreign politics have already signed away Ukraine’s sovereignty—if Putin is willing to pay the price for it.
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wjh4ew@virginia.edu
[1] “Ukraine” is the name of the existing Ukrainian state, whereas “the Ukraine” is the historical name for the region, used when its people lacked a sovereign nation of their own.