Court of Petty Appeals: John Doe v. Benvin Lozada
John Doe
v.
Benvin Lozada
It is a well-established precedent that food left upon the table in Walter Brown Hall is fair game for any passerby. This rule evidently did not resonate with a particular 2L on the fateful afternoon on Friday, Sept. 12, 2025.
This case originates from the alleged “theft” of a bag of Chick-fil-A. Upon returning from Chick-fil-A, this 2L left the bag on the table. Diverting his eyes from the table, he left the bag open to the students of Virginia Law. Like a flock of vultures sweeping down on a fresh carcass on the African Serengeti, a crowd gathered around the bag contemplating whether this was bounty open for the taking. A certain 1L swooped in, ripping the Chick-fil-A from the hordes. That certain 1L was identified through extensive police work as Benvin Lozada. This suit has been filed pseudonymously by said 2L against Mr. Lozada for the theft of said Chick-fil-A.
Moore, J., Majority Opinion.
Regarding Jonathan Doe v. Benvin Lozada, it has been argued that to employ the Finders-Keepers doctrine on the question of whence the Court must onfindaþ precedent with which to devise a remedy would be apropos, however the Court finds but one reaction is appropriate, “Oh God, not this shit.” See Petty Rules of Civil Procedure § 16. In the quest for a remedy, much as in the quest to destroy the one ring, the Court has onfundon obstacles from legal paralysis to the temptation of bribes exceeding our wildest dreams: an eleventh Dominos pizza. See John Ronald Reuel Tolkien, The Two Towers.
(Ir)regardless, the search for remedy must be built on a foundation of the facts which are: 1) a renowned 2L, and Lambda member procured vittles from a local dealer of fowl (Chick-fil-A); 2) the aforementioned 2L abandoned the aforesaid fowl on the free food table, ignorant of the doctrine of tragoedia bonorum communium; 3) a 1L, trained in the Walter Brown Hall culinary customs, observed the abandoned fowl and procured it for himself. Thanks to the work of our recently arrived protectors, the fowl was impounded to await judgment with a speed reminiscent of the “speedy police work” of our Iowan brethren. See Law Student Driver v. Commander in Chief Donald Trump, National Guard Parking Enforcement 78 U.Va 3 (2025); State v. Morris 677 N.W.2d 787 (2004). The Court finds itself responsible for deciding to whom to award the fought-for fowl—the 1L or the 2L.
The Petty Rules of Civil Procedure guide the Court with its second and third rules: “1Ls always lose unless it is funnier for them to win” and “(a) Our commitment is to the Bit. Therefore: (1) The funniest outcome must necessarily prevail. (2) In cases where both outcomes are equally funny, the most absurd outcome shall prevail.” See Petty Rules of Civil Procedure § 2; Petty Rules of Civil Procedure § 3. Whilst the inclination of the Court is to favor awarding the 2L as the funnier outcome based on the indefatigable principle of seniority, we must account for the words of our recently departed visiting Justice Sandler, “It's nice when little teams [1Ls] win.” See Sandler (2025). A Court as serious as the Court of Petty Appeals must bow to the comedic expertise of Sandler whilst not abdicating our own responsibility so the Court finds both outcomes to be equally funny. Moving to the second test, “the most absurd outcome shall prevail,” we would similarly favor making the 2L into the awardee on the grounds that a member of Lambda enjoying Chick-fil-A is absurd on its face per res ipsa loquitur. See Petty Rules of Civil Procedure § 3. However, given one of the Court’s most cherished rules decries “1Ls always lose”, the prospect of a 1L being awarded over a 2L is adjudged equally absurd. See Petty Rules of Civil Procedure § 2.
Arriving at the denouement of the established tests in our cherished Petty Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court finds itself shrouded in darkness. However, as our Gothamite colleague Dent once said, “[t]he night is darkest just before the dawn.” See Sir Christopher Nolan, The Dark Knight. Similarly we must cast a ray of light upon the precedents of bygone eras with the same persistence and endurance that saw the case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce resolved by a combination of “numerous difficulties, contingencies, masterly fictions, and forms of procedure.” See Charles Dickens, Bleak House 799. The clue to whence we must find the dusty precedent is, “Decisions of this Court can be appealed only to God.” See Petty Rules of Civil Procedure § 6. As Brother Maynard launched that most holy relic of Antioch in the Conundrum at Caerbannog, similarly we must launch a prayer or three and a half skyward in hopes of inspiration from our one supervising Court. See Terry Gilliam and Terry Jones, Monty Python and the Holy Grail; Saint Attila, Book of Armaments, chapter 2, verses 9-21.
Having received guidance from God we are directed to the examples of King Solomon and the Treaty of Tordesillas. When the learned King Solomon encountered two mothers desirous of the same child, much as the 1L and 2L are desirous of the same vittles, he ordered the child be sliced in twain unless one mother renounced her claim. The true mother did, thereby giving Solomon the evidence to properly award her the child over the impostor. See 1 Kings 3:16-28. Similarly, the papal Pope Julius II encountered a situation in which the Kingdoms of Spain and Portugal laid claim to the same globe (there is but one, for now anyway) and similarly split it betwixt the two monarchies by ratifying their heretofore heretical Treaty of Tordesillas. See Pope Julius II, Ea quae pro bono pacis. Much as Sir Isaac Newton stood on the shoulders of giants (though different ones from those of Tolkien), this Court should hereby stand astride the shoulders of King Solomon and Pope Julius II and requisition the services of Cavman and his sabre to split the contested consumables in two. “If it is to be said, so it be, so it is.” See Gregory Hirsch, Succession: This Is Not For Tears.
Koeppel, J., Dissenting.
My most esteemed and learned brother has set out a rather flowery and verbose opinion. If I have correctly absorbed the crux of his opinion, my brother believes the most appropriate remedy to the matter at hand is the slicing in half of the Chick-fil-A, thus awarding the 1L for his misdeeds. I respectfully dissent.
The Court seeks to upend the most fundamental rule of our court, in that 1Ls always lose unless it is funnier for them to win.” See Petty Rules of Civil Procedure § 2. There are manifold arguments in favor of our 1L defendant. However, he must not win under these circumstances. Our anonymous 2L would normally be found to have assumed the risk of placing a bag of Chick-fil-A on the free food table in Walter Brown Hall. In addition, the doctrine of abandoned property would normally carry the day in favor of our 1L colleague, as the Chick-fil-A bag was left in such a way suggesting abandonment in a place where food is commonly abandoned. Under no circumstances does this practice confer ownership. Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 75 (1985). However, granting Mr. Lozada any interest over the property would betray our Commitment to the Bit. See Petty Rules of Civil Procedure § 3. Thus, the 1L cannot win.
It is much more funny for this court to order Mr. Lozada to publicly atone before the Law School for his sin of correctly assuming that the food left upon the table in Walter Brown Hall was for the taking. That is the most absurd decision that this court may render under the circumstances, and it should be so. We do what we want. See Petty Rules of Civil Procedure § 1. Accordingly, I dissent.
Additionally, as a practical point, I struggle to see how we can cut a bag of Chick-fil-A in two, as if it were a human child by King Solomon, or the globe by the Catholic Church. Do we cut the physical bag or its contents? How do you split the Chick-fil-A sauce or the Waffle Fries? I am both confused and slightly troubled by the particular analogies offered, and the vital questions they pose which remain unanswered by the majority opinion.
[Justice Lozada took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.]